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When French foreign minister Laurent Fabius brought 
down the gavel on the Paris Agreement on 12 December 
2015, the international community reached a goal that had 
eluded it for six years: an updated and universal climate 
change agreement. It owed much to France’s diplomacy over 
the preceding 12 months, together with efficient, firm and 
innovative handling of the conference itself. Fundamental 
to the success of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) was 
the commitment at all levels from President Hollande down 
to engage with the broadest range of parties and non-state 
actors. The fruits of France’s engagement were nowhere more 
apparent than in the small island states’ comment in the final 
plenary that this was the first time they felt they had been 
listened to at a COP.
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Christiana Figueres on the podium – to 
dismay at yet another inadequate effort 
by the international community. But 
the Paris Agreement cannot be assessed 
independently of its contexts, both 
domestic and international.  
The text
The Paris Agreement and its lengthy 
accompanying decision can be seen as 
the completion of the third phase of 
international climate change negotiations 
(Macey, 2012), which finally allows for the 
full implementation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol, rather than being a stepping 
stone to a universal agreement, became 
an obstacle. ‘Saving the KP’ took up a 
huge amount of political and negotiating 
attention, which both interfered with and 
slowed progress on a broader agreement. 
In 2011 the Durban COP preserved the 
Kyoto Protocol long enough to enable a 
new negotiating mandate – the Durban 
Platform – to be agreed. A second 
commitment period under Kyoto was 
established; it will end in 2020 when the 
new agreement is to take effect. By 2014 it 
was clear that the Kyoto model of binding 
emissions reduction commitments and 
Other factors contributing to the success 
of COP21 were the lessons that had been 
learned from the failures at Copenhagen in 
2009, and, even more important, a much 
evolved international context, which the 
presidency shrewdly brought to bear on 
the negotiations. 
Reactions to COP21 have ranged from 
jubilation – displayed by Ban Ki Moon, 
the French leaders and UNFCCC head 
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penalties for non-compliance was a dead 
end. A third Kyoto commitment period 
beyond 2020 is thus highly unlikely. 
On mitigation, the Paris Agreement 
can be seen as implementing article 
4.1(b) of the convention. This is a 
fundamental provision, which introduces 
a binding obligation on all parties to 
reduce emissions and which the Kyoto 
Protocol does not fully reflect. Kyoto’s 
distinction between developed countries 
with quantified commitments (‘Annex I’ 
parties in the convention) and all others 
continued to influence negotiations. 
‘CBDR’ (common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities), widely argued by developing 
countries as a binary and enduring 
principle, was absent from the Durban 
mandate. It returned to later texts, but 
with an important addition of ‘in the 
light of different national circumstances’, 
which produced just enough constructive 
ambiguity for everyone to be satisfied 
with an agreement that, in the words of 
the Durban mandate, was to be ‘applicable 
to all’. That addition is retained and 
reiterated in the Paris Agreement. 
The recognition given to pursuing 
efforts towards a temperature goal of 
1.5° above pre-industrial levels was a 
major gain for poor and vulnerable 
countries. Whether it is achievable 
is another question, which will now 
receive more scientific attention. One 
outcome of COP21 is an invitation to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to prepare a special 
report on impacts of and pathways 
to 1.5°. Another is the elevation of 
adaptation and finance to be equal in 
rank to mitigation in the core article 2 
of the agreement. This was part of the 
trade-off for lessening the north/south 
distinctions. COP21 also brought much 
stronger recognition than previously to 
social and civil society concerns, as well 
as to the role of non-state actors. 
There are many shortcomings in the 
text, which have been amply highlighted 
by commentators. The implications 
of the latest science – and notably the 
requirement to reduce net CO
2
 emissions 
to zero – are reflected ambiguously. The 
concept finally agreed is of a balance 
between emissions and removals in 
the second half of the century. Clearer 
versions were a step too far for some 
parties highly dependent on fossil fuels. 
Details of the all-important review and 
transparency provisions are yet to be 
agreed. On finance little progress was 
made beyond extending current levels to 
2025. 
The dominant framing of the action 
required of parties is still ‘contributions’ 
rather than transition pathways, which 
would be better aligned with the science. 
The latter concept is, however, found 
in places, notably article 4.19, which 
advocates ‘long-term greenhouse gas 
emission development strategies’ and 
refers back to article 2. The decision 
invites parties to submit the strategies by 
2020. 
At its core, the text of the Paris 
Agreement has delivered:
•	 a	revised	and	restated	long-term	goal;
•	 a	more	universal	core	mitigation	
component with a corresponding 
compliance model of contributions, 
transparency and review to replace 
commitments and sanctions;
•	 an	updated	and	expanded	framework	
of rules, bodies and mechanisms 
drawing on the existing UNFCCC 
content as well as the previous ten 
years of negotiations.1 
The context
Much of France’s effort during the first 
week of the conference was directed 
outside the core negotiations. On the first 
day, 150 heads of state and government 
conveyed their expectation that there 
would be an agreement and a commitment 
to act. Then, at the end of the first week, 
a meeting of mayors of major cities from 
around the world (including Auckland) 
was followed by another high-level event 
focusing on the business sector. Both 
sectors demonstrated the action they 
were already taking on climate change, 
their intention to do more, and their 
expectations of what governments needed 
to do to facilitate. 
Outside these three major events 
there was a plethora of other influences, 
including the presence for the first 
time of a central bank governor at the 
conference (Mike Carney of the Bank of 
England) and repeated appearances by 
Al Gore, to mention just two. The terror 
attacks in Paris just two weeks before the 
conference were also present in delegates’ 
minds. While treated in a dignified and 
restrained manner by the host country 
during the conference, the attacks added a 
further reason to conclude an agreement; 
there is a parallel with the successful 
launch of World Trade Organization’s 
Doha round of trade negotiations soon 
after 9/11.
Perhaps applying a lesson from 
previous COPs, the presidency allowed 
negotiators full responsibility for running 
their process into the ground, which 
they predictably did by the end of the 
first week. The French could not in any 
way be held responsible, so there was no 
problem in gaining legitimacy for taking 
over the proceedings under a new body, 
the Paris Committee. The presidency 
pointed to the high expectations of an 
agreement, and warned negotiators that 
they needed to show themselves equal to 
the task, with a subtext that they would 
not be allowed to fail again. 
New Zealand at and after the COP
New Zealand was represented by the prime 
minister and two ministers. They were not 
asked to play any part in the facilitation 
of the negotiations, but were active in the 
other parts of the conference. New Zealand 
also gained credit for many of its ideas, 
including, importantly, on the legal form 
of the agreement. The prime minister led 
a session on fossil fuel subsidy reform, and 
trade and climate change minster Tim 
Groser was prominent at several events, 
including on trade and agriculture. At 
the end of the conference, New Zealand 
launched a declaration on carbon markets 
on behalf of a group of 18 countries.2 
The text meets most of New 
Zealand’s key needs. It provides for 
the use of carbon markets, recognises 
sinks, and gives reassurance that any 
accounting rules agreed will not be 
applied retrospectively to the first 
INDC (intended nationally determined 
contribution) period. But there are some 
difficulties ahead. New Zealand is unique 
among developed countries in envisaging 
most of its contribution coming from 
carbon markets – at least three quarters 
at the carbon price of $50 used in the 
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government’s modelling (New Zealand 
Government, 2015a). Echoing this, the 
New Zealand INDC assumes ‘unrestricted 
access to global carbon markets that 
enable trading and use of a wide variety 
of units’ (New Zealand Government, 
2015b). The assumption is that owing 
to our unique national circumstances, 
New Zealand can’t put forward a credible 
figure for its ‘fair share’ without markets. 
Even with this assumption, the INDC 
claims that the likely cost to the economy 
of New Zealand’s target is higher than 
that of other countries. Other countries 
use the cost of domestic reductions as 
the appropriate yardstick, with carbon 
markets potentially providing for more 
ambition. 
 Although the government has termed 
the INDC ‘provisional’, it is conditional 
in the ordinary meaning of the word. 
This carries a reputational risk: if at the 
time the agreement needed to be ratified 
there were still no carbon markets, or 
they were inadequate, there would be 
a temptation to reduce the target. New 
Zealand business expressed concerns 
about this aspect of the INDC, arguing 
that ‘having a target that New Zealand 
cannot hope to meet other than via the 
purchase of overseas emission reduction 
units would not be in New Zealand’s best 
long-term interests’ (BusinessNZ, 2015).
Even with unrestricted access to 
markets, there is a further risk to New 
Zealand over the longer term. The Paris 
Agreement requires that each new INDC 
be a progression over the previous one. 
But because international carbon units 
are not permanent reductions, to the 
extent that markets are used in New 
Zealand emissions, each time there is a 
new target New Zealand will begin with 
a liability from the previous period(s). 
This means effectively purchasing more 
units to get back to square one, until 
such time as real domestic reductions 
take place. Targets could thus become 
increasingly costly, a factor already seen 
in the government’s modelling of the 
costs for the current target (New Zealand 
Government, 2015a). By far the greatest 
proportion of the cost to households of 
the 2030 target is the reductions needed 
to get back to its 2020 starting point of 
5% below 1990 levels. 
A shift of the international focus 
over time to ‘transition’ rather than 
‘contribution’ would be logical, and 
better aligned with the science. It 
would lend itself to sector-by-sector 
international comparisons, which could 
leave New Zealand less exposed by its 
national circumstances in agriculture and 
electricity.
How should New Zealand respond 
to COP21? The current review of the 
Emissions Trading Scheme won’t suffice, 
since the terms of reference are too 
limited. Much more work is now needed, 
beginning with a re-examination of 
domestic mitigation potential and its 
costs and benefits. The modelling carried 
out for the INDC was limited in many 
respects, and it was not easy to access by 
stakeholders. Better public information 
would be a good start. It is worth noting 
that, after a conspicuous silence on the 
longer term, the government used the 
INDC to restate New Zealand’s goal of 
a 50% reduction on 1990 levels by 2050. 
That gives some useful context for the 
domestic exercise. 
Conclusion
The achievement of having wrested 
this agreement from the dysfunctional 
UNFCCC negotiations process and the 
role that traditional diplomacy played in 
getting there both deserve recognition. It 
was never a realistic hope that the result 
would ensure that global warming was 
limited to 2°, and indeed there is very 
little prospect that any sort of agreement 
based on repeated contributions would be 
enough. Its force is the signal that it gives 
to all actors, and it is a useful and updated 
framework. 
COP21 will best be judged by the 
contribution it makes to both incentivising 
and facilitating the domestic action that 
the Paris Agreement requires parties to 
pursue. The agreement certainly falls 
short in clarity and ambition in places, 
and is still far from operational. The 
UNFCCC now has a challenging work 
programme ahead to make it so. But it is a 
decisive political step forward. A question 
to watch over the coming two to three 
years will be how far the new context will 
inspire the negotiating process to lift its 
game so as to produce the right text at 
the right time. 
1 For detailed summaries and commentary on the COP21 
outcome see IISB, 2015; Mabey et al., 2015; and Centre for 
Climate and Energy Solutions, 2015.
2 Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Iceland, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Senegal, 
Ukraine and the United States.
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